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NOTRE DAME CONFERENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION - A REPORT
This is the report of a conference on problems of Congressional civil rights
legislation held at the Notre Dame Law School February 8 - 10, 1963. By
fortunate coincidence, as the report was completed Congress had already before
it a civil rights bill backed by unusually strong Presidential support.
This circumstance has had, of course, its difficult side for the preparers of
this report, the least of which has been revising an earlier draft in order to take
account of the Administration's measure. In fact, most of the provisions of the
President's proposal (except Title II) were debated, at least in general terms,
by the conference, and a consensus reached about them.
A more basic difficulty will be apparent when we note that the working
premise of the Notre Dame Conference, as laid down by Dean Joseph O'Meara
in our first session, was that we should frame recommendations without regard
to anyone's views of their political chances. This is, therefore, a report of the
consensus we reached as to what Congress should pass, not as to what it possibly
or probably might pass.
We continue to believe that this was a sound approach. We do, of course,
recognize that the legislative decision this year will be made on the Administration's bill. Perhaps, nevertheless, what is reported here will be helpful to Congress
as it deliberates, and will help the country understand better the problems and
the results which may be expected from various legislative approaches to them.
The conference was limited to three subjects: schools, employment, and
voting. We have, therefore, no recommendations or reflections to report on the
public accommodations part of the President's program (Title II).
This report states the consensus of the conference. The extent of agreement
reached through extensive discussion was impressive, and except at a few points
the consensus was well-nigh complete. This was all the more notable, because
many differing views had been brought to the meetings.
The conferees participated as individuals, not as representatives of their
organizations. They included, in addition to Dean O'Meara, Carl A. Auerbach,
University of Minnesota Law School; Wiley A. Branton, Voter Education Project; Thomas F. Broden, Jr., Notre Dame Law School; Leslie W. Dunbar,
Southern Regional Council; John G. Feild, President's Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity (as observer); Harold C. Fleming, The Potomac
Institute; G. W. Foster, Jr., Law School, University of Wisconsin; Eli Ginzberg,
Conservation of Human Resources, Columbia University; Vivian W. Henderson,
Economics, Fisk University; Paul H. Norgren, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University; John de J. Pemberton, American Civil Liberties Union; Daniel H.
Pollitt, University of North Carolina Law School; John Silard, Attorney, Washington, D. C.; Michael I. Sovern, Columbia University School of Law; William
Taylor, U. S. Commission on Civil Rights (as observer); John H. Wheeler,
Attorney, Durham, North Carolina. We had also the benefit of consultation
with President Hesburgh, and the gracious, friendly hospitality of the Notre
Dame campus.
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INTRODUCTION

The crisis of America's race relations has become almost unbearably intense,
and its causes are interlaced with countless characteristics of our history and
our social structure. These are propositions for which any elaboration, at this
time, would be redundant.
The present crisis is not the first in our history. Crises in race relations, as
in the other relationships of men with men, are not necessarily caused by worsened
conditions; the opposite may in fact be so. But as long as the relationships enclose and nurture discontent on one or both sides, periodic crises will occur.
The present crisis is far less brutal and violent than that of 1917 - 1921. It has
probably been accompanied by no deeper or more widespread moral self-scrutiny,
religious debate, or intellectual and literary study than went with the racial
crisis of Civil War days.
Those crises passed, and after each the condition of Negro Americans was
still bad. What is primarily different about the present crisis is that it is not
likely to pass until a new equilibrium acceptable to Negroes is reached. Earlier
crises ended when white people tired of them; this one will not.
The pressure of this fact, or perhaps the realization of it, has much to do
with creating the contemporary emotional urgings of both Negroes and whites,
the all too facile bandying about of such concepts as "hatred" and "revolution," and the obsessive overvaluation of the strength of the Black Muslims.
On the other hand, prudence, if nothing else, dictates the working assumption
that no person has reason to have an attachment to a constitutional system
if its processes fail to make real its guarantees.
If Congress had no other reason to act to end the crisis, this would be
sufficient: unless the crisis is overcome, the Constitution as we know it will bend.
Concepts such as federalism, and universal obedience to the courts, and Presidential deference to the legislative will of Congress, have already been affected.
There are reasons at least as good, and some of us will think even better, for
Congressional action: these have to do with justice and friendship and religion. But Congress has a special responsibility to defend and protect the Constitution.
Political science distinguishes between the "deliberative" and the "representative" functions of a legislature. Congress is our representative body, and
there is no other which can so express and certify the national will. As long
as Congress is silent, civil rights has something of a bootleg aspect. Congress
has not been altogether silent. The Acts of 1957 and 1960 and the poll tax
amendment are of value, but at the most they give protection, and a laggard
one at that, for but one right. What the country urgently needs, and what
American constitutionalism is weakened by the absence of, is an unambiguous
registering of the national will in behalf of racial justice, as only Congress
in its representative role can do.
The subsequent pages of this paper are hopefully intended to help Congress in its deliberative role; i.e., in defining and framing its policies. In this
field of civil rights, and at this time, Congress by deliberating and enacting will
also be representing, supplying the will and the resolution that can put the
crisis behind us.
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The times require, in other words, not only that Congress act wisely, but
that it act - and act with dispatch, and without ambiguity or timidity. But
if in its drive to represent the national will, Congress does not act wisely, the
outcome could be bitter. Congress passed voting laws in 1957 and 1960 which
were not suited to achieve their goals, and have not done so. Their failure has
contributed to the present crisis, because those laws brought disillusion on top
of high hopes.
In order to act effectively, Congress should be guided by certain principles
that include the following:
Congress should legislate not for the appeasement of crisis, but
(1)
for the solution of it.
Administrative actions, when appropriate and constitutional,
(2)
are more effective and less piecemeal than judicial remedies.
Where possible and suitable, it is good federal practice to draw
(3)
support from state and local governments in the administration of federal
programs.
(4) In some problem areas, the national interest is best served by
local solutions. In such problem areas, Congressional action is not appropriate when there is a realistic prospect of a prompt solution at the
local level.
EQUAL RIGHTS TO PUBLIC EDUCATION
The first point above is especially pertinent in 1963. Congressional action
at this time ought to begin with schools. We say this with all the emphasis
we can.
There are at least five reasons for this priority.
First, nine years have now passed since Brown v. Topeka declared a constitutional right of all American children, a right still wantonly flouted or ignored. In support of it, and in the face of overt defiance, the Presidency was
until the fall of 1957 indecisive and since has been inadequately empowered.
Congress has done nothing.
The decision was responded to by eleven southern states with defiance,
lawlessness, and at times near rebellion. In a sense, it is a sign of the basic
strength of American society that defiance so intense and widespread was able
to be contained without rupture of national bonds. The federal courts and
the Presidency, aided by enlightened opinion in the South, have by now decisively weakened the political resistance. Nevertheless, through evasion or
inaction, more than two-thirds of the biracial school districts of the eleven
southern states have as yet made no start toward school desegregation; 99%
of the Negro children of these states are still in segregated schools; and in three
states - Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina - not even a token start
has yet been made.
The Supreme Court's decision of 1954 was received by Negro citizens
as a promise and as an earnest of a new life for them in our common country.
A very large cause of the current crisis is the disappointment which followed.
Our high court had spoken - and was not obeyed. The good will of our
people had been invoked - and did not respond.
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There is, therefore, a symbolic importance to the schools issue which none
other has. In no other area can Congress so clearly and unambiguously represent and register a national decision in affirmation of equality. Furthermore,
if Congress were to act in another area, and did not in this one, recalcitrant
school districts would have reason to believe that Congress does not disapprove
of their policies.
Second, education has an intrinsic value, both for the individual and for
the nation, of unsurpassed importance.
Third, education is basic to the durable achievement of other civil rights.
It affects employment opportunities and voting eligibility and the intelligent
use of the ballot. It affects housing patterns (and is affected by them). It determines and will determine the quality and the temper of Negro communal
leadership.
Fourth, there should be no hesitation in saying that our needs go beyond
civil rights, and that a better integrated society is a social, political, and moral
imperative. The American people need to live more happily with each other.
Our public schools weave the web of society as no other institution does.
Fifth, school integration brings forth the hard, but basically important,
issues. (The extension of employment opportunities does also.) To desegregate
transportation, or restaurants and hotels, or professional associations requires
little more than a decision to stop doing one thing and do another. These
decisions are socially and morally necessary, but the Negro and white people
of this country would both delude themselves if they expected these decisions
to go far toward solving our racial inequities. To solve them, or even to begin to do so, the country must see dearly and face the gigantic problems of
our disadvantaged people. Whenever school desegregation in a community
gets beyond token dimensions, that community will unavoidably confront the
cultural wrongs it itself has created, and will, we think, be brought to an awareness that something must be done about them.
To summarize then, school legislation deserves priority because of its
symbolic value, because of the intrinsic cultural importance of education, because education is basic to the achievement of other civil rights, and because
the integration of schools has profound and beneficial social consequences.
The bill first introduced by Senator Clark and Representative Celler in
1961* sought to achieve these objectives. It has provided the leading ideas which
have guided discussions since 1961, and which the conferees at the Notre Dame
Law School believed basically sound. In important respects, however, we did
differ from Clark-Celler.
The principal features of the Clark-Celler approach are (1) the requirement of a desegregation plan by those school districts which use race as an
assignment criterion; (2) the filing of the plan with the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, who is empowered to grant financial and technical
assistance to aid in carrying out the plans, if he determines that the plans are
legally satisfactory; similar assistance would be available to certain other districts; (3) a requirement of "at least first-step compliance" immediately; and
*

S. 1817, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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(4) power for the Attorney-General to bring suits in federal district courts to
compel compliance.
We believe that Congress should prepare an enactment which would embrace the following purposes:
(1) A start must be effected, with provision for federal enforcement, in
the more than 2000 biracial school districts that have made no beginning.
(2) The completion of the desegregation process should be facilitated, in
accordance with sound educational precepts.
(3) Neither federal legislation nor administration should impede the initiation of suits by private plaintiffs in federal courts, or prejudice
the outcome of their suits.
(4) Nor should the federal role inhibit the reaching of local desegregation solutions by local consensus.
Of the above purposes, Nos. 3 and 4 have definite implications for northern
school desegregation. Congress cannot at this time, however, wisely legislate to
meet directly the northern questions (i.e., segregation not resulting from explicit governmental policy), and should not, therefore, try. Constitutional rights
and principles have not yet been sufficiently clarified by adjudication, and professional controversy still somewhat obscures the educational merits of various
solutions. Moreover, there is no reason at this date to suppose that local solutions cannot be satisfactorily and readily attained. (See principle no. 4, page
432 supra.)
Congress should candidly legislate for the southern problem, and the premier
objective should be to effect start. To this end, Congress should impose an
affirmative duty on every public school board to operate the schools under its
jurisdiction on a nonracial basis. To assure this, formally recorded desegregation plans should be required of every biracial district, not already under
court order, where initial assignment of school children is by race, or where,
regardless of assignment policies, no Negro and white children are in fact in
school together. The plan should be a document of public record. Its recording
should be completed shortly after enactment, and certainly in not more than
60 days; more time is not required: there is nothing arcane about desegregation planning, and there exists an abundance of experience to consult.
The effect of this would be a Congressional finding and declaration that
"all deliberate speed" means "now."* No defendant in a school desegregation
case could henceforth plead time.
No purpose would be obviously served by requiring that the plans be
filed with any office in Washington. There are good reasons why they should
not be. Unless the federal office were to review and evaluate them, there would
be no need for it to be custodian. Administrative review would be unfortunate.
What pleased the Secretary of HEW would tend to please a federal judge,
and the rights of a Negro plaintiff to seek redress in a federal court would become progressively, and merely, formal. His remedy would be through his
Washington lobbyist, not through his local lawyer.
*

Cf. The Supreme Court's gloss in Watson v. Memphis, 10 L.ed 2d 529 (1963).
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The Attorney-General must be empowered to intervene in pending school
litigation, and, more importantly, to bring suit in the name of the United
States to effect prompt desegregation starts, through civil action or other proceeding for preventive relief, including an application for an injunction against
school boards depriving or threatening to deprive individuals of their equal
protection rights. The affirmative duty should be defined in the statute in such
a way as to preserve in full the freedom of action of private plaintiffs,* and
to give at least tacit Congressional recognition to the impossibility of the Attorney-General filing suits in as many as 2,000 districts (in the unhappy and
unlikely chance that would be indicated), and the consequent desirability of
his bringing suit in the most strongly resistant areas.**
The Attorney-General should proceed on his own investigation, as he does
in voting violations under the Civil Rights Act of 1957.t He should not have
to await on complaints; the privilege of private counsel for private complainants
should be fully preserved and should suffice. Congress has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the terms of the 14th Amendment;t' by a statute such,
as is recommended here it would do so by affirming the duty of school boards
to operate nonracial systems; the Attorney-General can and should, consequently, be made responsible to combat violations which he discovers. We need
to remember that Brown v. Topeka is not a limitation on the power of Congress;
the Supreme Court proscribed denial of an individual right. This does not inhibit Congress from going beyond to a general protection of the right.
The simple, yet conclusive, reasons for placing this responsibility on the
Attorney-General are to expedite the desegregation process, bring to bear national authority, and relieve Negro plaintiffs, organizations, and lawyers of
some of their heavy psychological and financial burdens.
To do an effective job, the already overstrained staff of the Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice will have to be strengthened. The present
Administration has considerably enlarged that staff and its function since January
1961, but has done so in part by using personnel from other Divisions. The Administration should ask Congress for the money needed to staff adequately the
Civil Rights Division, and Congress should provide it.
The right of private plaintiffs to bring suit should not, we repeat, be impaired or diluted by new statutory authority for the Attorney-General. The law
of school desegregation is evolving through the courts, and in terms of individual
rights, not public policies. Whether the nation would have been better off had
it a decade ago approached the issue differently, through statutes rather than
decrees, is an interesting but now practically irrelevant question. It did not, and
now is too late for constructive change. The atmosphere for freely litigating
* Cf. § 310 of S. 1731; also Sec. 1602 of S. 772, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. introduced by
Senator Clark.
Cf. The formula "materially further the orderly progress of desegregation in public
**
education." S. 1731, sec. 307 a2.
t P. L. 85-315, sec. 131 (c); cf. also Sec. 108 of S. 1209 (88th Cong., 1st session),
introduced by Senator Kuchel and others, which would confer on the Attorney-General
the power and the duty in school cases recommended here. The approach of S. 1209 to
this problem is, therefore, much to be preferred over that of the Administration's bill.
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5.
tt
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and adjudicating individual claims to rights should be carefully preserved. There
are still many unanswered 14th Amendment questions, particularly in connection with northern desegregation but also in the South. Hard and fast rules
are, of course, impossible, but we would suggest that the Attorney-General plan
his cases to spread and consolidate judicial interpretations already secured, and
that the definition of new legal concepts to be sought be left to private plaintiffs and their attorneys.
The authority and the duty to bring suits in behalf of the United States
are indispensable and already far too long withheld. Yet the Congressional requirement of "plans" is, if anything, even more worthwhile. It would put a
positive duty on local people, and the country badly needs to begin thinking of
school desegregation in those terms. While we believe that the Supreme Court
in Cooper v. Aaron* in 1958 did affirm this duty, nobody speaks the national
will as does Congress. There are persuasive grounds also for believing that such
a mandate from Congress would be obeyed in a great many school districts, and
that much litigation could thereby be avoided.
To give further impetus to the integration process, the federal government should offer, on application to the Secretary of HEW, financial assistance
to school districts making their first starts, or to districts, whether of the South
or the North, revising their systems in the direction of more integration.
Assistance should be limited to specific projects proposed by the local
school administrators, and should be strictly limited to projects facilitating the
desegregation process. Examples might include programs of teacher preparation, special tuition for Negro students to help overcome the academic handicaps of their inferior schooling, and special training for Negro teachers to help
overcome the academic shortcomings of their training. The assistance, which
could be either by grant, loan, or both, should be based by the Secretary on
a finding that the project as described and planned by the local administrators
would make a substantial contribution to the success of desegregation.
The Secretary should be instructed by the statute to adopt as his criterion
of "desegregation" a unified school system. Only those projects should qualify
which look toward, and are integral parts of a plan toward, the full integration
of faculties, administrators,facilities, and the assignment of all students without regard to race; and which envision this accomplishment within a reasonably
short period.**
Other forms of federal assistance, not reasonably connected to such technical
projects as are mentioned above, should not be offered by Congress. So-called
"compensatory" aid has sometimes been proposed, even to the inclusion of construction costs. We think there is a moral flaw in such proposals, and that
358 U.S. 1, 1619 (1958).
Although otherwise the technical assistance provisions (Sections 301-306) of the
Administration's bill seem to us soundly planned, they do rest on a definition of "desegregation" (Sec. 301b) which may well be soon obsolete. There are cases pending, some for
a long while, which go beyond the bill's definition as "assignment . . . without regard to
* * , race." Several northern cases seek, in effect, a finding that the 14th Amendment right
is a right to attend a biracial school. But there are also cases in the South which go further
than the assignment question and which argue that the 14th Amendment confers a right
to attend a school system which is organized and administered throughout, without regard
to race.
**
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they also rest on an unproven, and we suspect unprovable, premise; viz., that
integrated schools exceed the cost of "separate, but equal" schools.* Furthermore
school desegregation law should not be a means of importing federal aid to
education through the legislative back door for some school districts only. Construction can be adroitly used to freeze or even to reverse the process of desegregation and this is a second reason for not allowing federal cost assistance.
Several bills before the 88th Congress, including the Administration bill,
would extend and broaden the functions of the Commission on Civil Rights,
and would direct it to become a clearinghouse for information and a supplier
of technical advice and assistance to those responsible for school desegregation
(and other civil rights matters). As stated in S. 1117 and H. R. 5456, the CCR
would
serve as a national clearing house
for information, and provide advice and
technical assistance to Government agencies,
communities, industries, organizations or
individuals in . . . the fields of voting,
education, housing, employment, the use of
public facilities, transportation, and the
administration of justice.
We think there is much merit in the proposal, though as pertains to education the respective roles of the Commission and the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare should be carefully distinguished.
Finally, Congress should, of course, repeal that section of the Morrill Act**
which countenances segregated land grant colleges. The provision is anachronistic, and we believe of no legal standing or force now; consequently, we think
the Administration has been lax by its continued observance of it. Congress
should, nevertheless, remove this stain.
Moreover, probably the largest federal investment in education is represented by the vast federal research programs. In these various programs, Congress has imposed no dictates on the President or his subordinates as to choice
of recipient. It is and has been the executive who often chooses to spend funds
at segregated institutions, and it is the executive who has the responsibility to
stop doing so.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS

Private property rights have historically included an employer's rights to
select his employees. Even with complete legal freedom, however, employers
have been strongly influenced in their hiring policies by the pressures of popular
opinion and custom, and by the prejudices (or supposed prejudices) of customers
and other employees. Such restrictions on the employer's freedom to hire as he
* There might be a case for compensation had the South in fact provided equal schools.
The logic would be that southern states had acted on the understanding that Plessy v.
Ferguson was the law of the land, and therefore merited assistance when the constitutional issue was settled to the contrary in 1954. Whatever the force of this argument, it is
lost both by the failure to provide equality between 1896 and 1954, and by noncompliance
after 1954.
**
And should do likewise with similar provisions of law in other fields, such as the
Hill-Burton Act. These goals would be realized by Section 601 of the Administration bill.
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pleases do not need to be organized in order to be effective. In contrast, members of minority groups can exert influence on the employer only by organizing
(e.g., a boycott) or with the assistance of law.
Federal law has for some years restricted the employer's freedom to discriminate against union members, to hire children, to employ women on prejudicial terms, and to pay substandard wages or to work overlong hours.
With this history, there is no obvious reason why the question of the
rights of private property should again be debated. It would seem that unless
one were prepared to argue for the repeal of these other restrictions on the
employer's freedom, he could not legitimately contend for a right to discriminate
on racial or creedal grounds.
On the other hand, racial and creedal discrimination does in a unique way
involve the prejudices not only of the employer himself but of his customers and
other employees. Very probably, both the extent and the durability of this
prejudice are exaggerated. But regardless, when the employer's prejudice is reinforced by that of customers and fellow workers, the economic situation of
the minority group member is especially hopeless, and especially deserving of
legal protection. A democratic government has no higher task than the protection of the weak.
The government of our democracy has indeed impelling reasons to combat
employment discrimination. These may be summed up under the three heads
of developing talents and skills, enlarging national purchasing power, and the
continuing obligation of America to build an open, fluid society.
There is little need to dwell here on economics. The drastic and rapidly
recurring transition in technology and in distribution methods, the imperative
of an expanding market in order to sustain economic growth, the pressures
of population, and the steady obliteration of regional economies all point to an
inexorable need that people be equipped with marketable skills and talents and
that they be enabled to earn well in order to buy well. Our national self-interest
coincides with Negro aspirations for employment opportunities.
A sound democracy must be a society open to talents. In simpler days,
of industrial adolescence, abundant land, and scarce people, government had
only to leave alone in order for talents to flourish and find their levels. Modern
government has to hold back and clear away the weeds and the clutter of a matured and complicated society that choke some of our people from the chance
to develop themselves. Job discrimination is a particularly obnoxious growth,
and one which is practically insuperable through .individual effort. And as Mr.
Robert Weaver has said, "Discrimination in housing and public places and in
education is degrading and insulting. But discrimination in employment robs a
man of the daily bread for himself and his family."
No one should suppose that an antidiscrimination law will in itself end
the employment hardships of Negroes. It will not. We have an enormous problem
of disadvantaged people, embracing perhaps a tenth or even more of our citizens
who are undereducated, wrongly trained, and culturally distorted. These people, who are of all races, are poorly prepared to accept employment opportu*

As quoted in the New York Times, June 5, 1963.
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nities, and their rescue from inaptitude is a mammoth national task which
nearly all governmental bodies have as yet combined in shirking. President Kennedy, in his message of June 19, 1963, coupled manpower training with civil
rights. Congress should give unstinted consideration to this part of the message,
and to the bills now before it to carry out the training program.
Yet if nondiscrimination is not a specific cure, discrimination has been a
specific cause. It has to be removed, in schools, in employment, in housing, and
at the polls, or else there can be no general progress in the well-being of our
disadvantaged people, or their ability to add to the common good.
We can conveniently look at the employment question under several categories:
1. federal employment;
2. employment in interstate and foreign commerce;
3. employment by federal contractors;
4. employment by state and local governments;
5. employment by state and local governments, and by private institutions,
for work financed by federal funds.
(1) There is no need for Congress to legislate regarding discrimination in
federal employment. The President has sufficient authority to set standards in
the Civil Service, and he has the clear responsibility to prevent discrimination.
President Kennedy has gone further, and the present Administration has conscientiously and vigorously made a special effort to recruit and place Negroes in
nontraditional jobs, and to hire in larger numbers. Much progress has, accordingly, been made toward fairer representation, and toward enhancing the
aspirations of Negroes by the visible evidence of real opportunities. The President
has only persuasive authority over certain independent agencies, but that is
usually enough; if he should find that it is'not, he could report his difficulties
to Congress. In federal employment, the responsibility is the President's, and
Congress should not dilute it by presumptive acting.

(Z) Acting under the commerce clause, Congress should ban discrimination by all businesses engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. The
law should contain a prohibition against discrimination on account of race,
color, creed, or national origin, and a complaint procedure available either
to the complaining individual or an organization acting in his behalf and at
his request. The prohibition should extend not only to discrimination in hiring,
but also to discrimination in recruitment; promotion, demotion, or transfer;
layoff and dismissal; compensation; selection for training, including apprenticeship; membership in employee organizations; seniority rights; and access to
*all plant or office facilities.
The responsibility for administering the law should be vested in the Department of Labor. We think this preferable to a commission-type administration (an FEPC) because it would permit vigorous'enforcement through established regulatory procedures. Enforcement of fair employment is a natural adjunct to the Labor Department's enforcement of wages and hours standards
or other federally imposed standards on employers.
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This means that the Department should not only act on complaints, but
should by appropriate regulations establish suitable enforcement, inspection, and
educational programs. Enforcement should include the power to order specific
alterations of practice, and to issue cease and desist orders.
A complaint procedure is half meaningless unless it is, as it usually is not,
expeditious. Congress should consult the experience of the various state antidiscrimination commissions now operating, as well as that of the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities. One suggestion that Congress
might consider is a provision that all complaints be heard initially by authorized
regional or district officials, or by specially assigned officials in case of overcrowded
dockets; that a decision must be given within 30 days of filing of complaint;
and that in the event of employer appeal against a decision, the individual should
during the appeal period have the benefits of the examiner's finding.
We think there should be no elaborate appeals procedure, available either
to the employer or the individual. Appeals should go directly from the examiner
to an impartial appeals board, and its decision should be final, subject only to
review by a federal Court of Appeals confined to questions of law and due
process. A similar appeals procedure would suffice for contesting the orders of
an inspector enforcing the Department's regulations.
An interesting question is the relationship of a federal fair employment
program to the state programs now operative, with enforcement powers, in 20
states.* We think federal programs should not preempt satisfactory state programs, even for firms in interstate or foreign commerce, unless there is a clear-cut
administrative advantage. This should not be beyond the skill of legislative
draftsmen to provide, nor should cooperative administration be beyond the ingenuity of federal and state officials. An approach to a like question is taken by
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, which expressly negates an inference of federal pre-emption in those situations where the federal agency has
not assumed jurisdiction, and thereby permits parties to obtain relief under
state law, Washington has enough to do without doing a job that the states can
do as well or better. It may well be that both employer and minority group
member would prefer a state administration close at hand, to a remote and impersonal federal.
(3)
Employment by federal contractors is a special case. Appropriately,
federal contractors should, in virtue of their relationship to the government,
make a special contribution to the national need to utilize and develop fully
our manpower. The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity
has diligently established a compliance system under Executive Order 10925
and, operating on the base of a statute applicable to all interstate commerce, the
Committee could drop its policing functions and concentrate on the much discussed but rather nebulous "affirmative" requirements of the Executive Order.
It could, in other words, demand from contractors, and aid them in effecting
positive programs to bring minority group members into full participation in the
*
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. Antidiscrimination laws, with little or
no enforcement power, exist also in Idaho, Indiana, and Kentucky.
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national work force, on the premise that firms doing business with the government enter thereby into a partnership of national goals. Of the various techniques
the Committee and, under its guidance, federal offices have already devised, we
are especially impressed by the Defense Department's staff of Intergroup Relations Specialists, working in the field with contractors. No separate legislation
seems required, the President having clear enough authority through his procurement power. Certainly, however, the President should ask for and Congress
should grant funds necessary for the Committee, instead of using funds, as at
present, appropriated for other purposes; if a statutory foundation for the Committee would facilitate this, that legislation should pass.
Furthermore, by control of appropriations both for the Committee and more importantly - for the statutory programs over all employment in interstate and foreign commerce, Congress would be in a position to terminate. This
is as it should be. We should not suppose an everlasting need for antidiscrimination measures. It may be an enduring part of human psychology to pay as
little as one can for as much as one can get, and therefore a wage and hour law
will always be useful. But to believe that racial prejudice is similarly basic to
human nature is morally self-defeating. Our conviction must be that once the
discrimination barriers are broken, and minority members are equipped to hold
their own, there will be in a free society neither the desire nor the possibility of
re-erecting the old walls.
(4) Does employment discrimination by state or municipal bodies fall
under the ban of the equal protection clause? The question has not been adjudicated but the trend of recent decisions is clearly in that direction.
(5) A quite different question is presented by state or local programs
financed in whole or in substantial part by federal dollars. The temptation to
discuss this issue at length is considerable, for some of the racially discriminatory
uses of federal money are shocking, through a great variety of outlets including
but unfortunately not limited to the National Guard, the U. S. Employment
Service, Hill-Burton hospital construction, the several federal highway programs, the multitudinous federal farm offices, air terminals, and many others.
But many words might serve only to obscure the simplicity of the matter. It ought
to be axiomatic that wherever money from the common treasury goes within
this country, the Constitution goes along. It is unthinkable that the use of federal
money to favor some of us and disfavor others of us could be rationally defended.
This is so clear that to many it is not at all clear that any legislation to this end
seems needed: the President, it would seem, has no right to spend money which
will yield racial discrimination. The hard job of enforcement would be made
more feasible, however, by Congressional action. A prohibition on discrimination by state and local governments or their contractors or agents, on all projects
financed in whole or in substantial part by the federal treasury, should be included in the proposed fair employment act,* and administered by the Department of Labor, with the added sanction of a funds cutoff to insure compliance.
Sec. 601 of the Administration's bill could accomplish this end. The President's Executive Order 11114 of June 22, 1963, also will help.
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VOTING

RIGHTS

The Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 were addressed principally to
voting rights. That these first civil rights acts in four generations were concerned
with voting, evidences its centrality among our civic values as well as our civic
shortcomings. The problem of voting rights has been long and familiarly before
us, and has been thoroughly documented by the U. S. Commission on Civil
Rights;* further description here would be superfluous.
From the history of the last few years, some conclusions and inferences
can be drawn, which we state seriatim:
(1) With the exception of a few pockets of discrimination against American Indians and Mexicans the denial of voting rights is a problem peculiar to
certain areas in southern states and to their Negro residents. The problem is not
even regional in scope: in extensive areas of the South, and the most populous
one at that, Negroes today register and vote freely. Legislation of general
application, such as the Administration's literacy bill of 1962, * would supersede state laws all over the country in order to reach abuses that are state-wide
in at most only two or three states, and which are virulent in parts of not more
than three others.t"
(2)
Voting discrimination and low Negro participation are not always
equivalent. In the states of Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia, where there are today only isolated and passing discriminatory practices, Negro participation is low but is remediable by education and organized
effort; the same is true of large areas of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina,
and scattered areas of the other three Deep South states. The evil of discrimination is confined, in other words, to certain communities of the Deep South
where the constitutional prohibition against voting discrimination is openly
flouted and efforts to obtain or to exercise voting rights are met by acts of intimidation, harassment, and physical violence, sanctioned and sometimes even
participated in by local authorities and law enforcement officers.t These are,
and should rationally be regarded as, outlaw communities. Our federal system
will be less seriously challenged by federal power brought to bear directly on
these communities, than by federal laws which supersede state laws everywhere.
(3)
This is not meant to preclude federal regulation of elections, or the
establishment of federal standards when, in the judgment of Congress, they are
necessary or desirable. There is, we think, outstanding merit in the bill intro*
See Report of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1959. Voting, 1961, U.S.C.C.R.
Report. Hearings Before the U.S.C.C.R., Voting, 1959 (the Alabama hearings). Equal Protection of the Laws in North Carolina, U.S.C.C.R., 1962. See also: Civil Rights-1959, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary,
U. S. Senate, 86th Cong., 1st sess., Parts I-IV.
*
The Senate rider to H. R. 1361, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
j At least two bills are before the 88th Cong., 1st Sess. which would implement the
14th amendment by reducing the House representation of states depriving eligible persons
of the franchise: S. 1644 introduced by Sen. McNamara; and H. R. 6801, introduced by
Rep. Stratton. To the same end is Lampkin v. Hodges, filed May 28, 1963 before the U. S.
District Court of the District of Columbia.
tt See Report of the Mississippi Advisory Committee, Report on Mississippi, January
1963, U.S.C.C.R. Report; Voter Education Project, press release of March 28, 1963 on 64
Mississippi atrocities.
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duced by Senator Hart at each Congress since 1959.* Senator Hart's bill
authorizes the federal administration of registration and primary and general
elections for U.S. Senators and Representatives in any district where a Congressional Election Commission "determines that unless such election is conducted
by the Commission, persons having the qualifications requisite for electors of the
most numerous branch of the legislature of the State in which the Congressional District is located are likely to be denied their right... to cast their votes
and to have them fairly counted." On the sound premise that Congress has full
authority under Article I, Sec. 4 of the Constitution to regulate elections of its
own members, the proposed Commission would act solely at its discretion and
without any recourse to the courts. It would, however, follow state law in
registering eligible voters.
(4) The Hart bill goes to the key issue, as the Administration's 1962
literacy bill did not. The tool of discrimination is not the literacy laws of southern
states, but their immoral and illegal administration, coupled with the physical
intimidation and economic coercion of Negroes. Nor would the proposed sixthgrade literacy presumption of the Administration's 1963 voting bill** reach the
extra-legal threat of violence or economic reprisal, and there is every prudent
reason to suppose that communities which now illegally administer literacy requirements would resort to these extra-legal methods if their practices were set
aside by a federal rule. Enactment of the sixth-grade presumption would provide
a salutary device, but we caution against overly optimistic expectation of its
value.
(5)
In 1959 the Commission on Civil Rights proposed that federal
registrars be appointed by the President in counties found by the President to
practice discrimination.t Congress chose, instead, in the Civil Rights Act of
1960 to invoke the judicial process. Experience does not suggest that this was
wise. Voter registration is, after all, a ministerial act. The courts' proper and
necessary function is to protect individuals from illegal treatment by the functionnaires commissioned to register their names. To ask the courts to do more
than this, to ask them - as the Act of 1960 does - to look into the complex
whole of a county's or state's practices and ascertain what "pattern" exists, to
ask them to supervise the registration of deprived persons or even to register them
directly, all this is a heavy and unnatural load on the judicial process. The Acts
of 1957 and 1960 were intended to facilitate Negro registration, but they were
poorly designed for that purpose. It is sufficient to note that of the 40 voting cases
filed under the Acts of 1957 and 1960, only 19 have reached decisions, and of
the 30 cases filed since January 20, 1961, only 9 have been decided.
We seriously question, therefore, whether Congressional effort should be
expended on the further refining of a basically defective approach. The Administration's present effort to do so (Sec. 101c) seeks by extraordinarily, almost

S. 1281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
S. 1731, § 101(b). See also the Administration's earlier bill, S. 1283, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963).
f Report of the U.S.C.C.R., 1959, p. 141.
*

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
monstrously, complicated means to make judicial administration perform a
ministerial service. The effort should be to get the voting question out of the
courts, not more deeply into it.
(6)
The Acts of 1957 and 1960, imperfect as they are, do provide legal
means for federal suppression of the grosser violations of the 14th and 15th
Amendments. The Department of Justice has enforced them conscientiously and,
with additional lawyers, could do yet more. (Amendment of the laws would be
far less helpful than would appropriations making possible more attorneys in
the Civil Rights Division.) As previously said, voting discrimination occurs now,
with but few exceptions, only against Negroes and only in some localities of the
South. By their defiance of the constitutional order, these places are virtually
outlaw communities. New and more refined legislative remedies are not required
to reach this blatant disregard of rights. To contain and disarm lawlessness, a
clear federal presence is required at the first outbreaks. We think the AttorneyGeneral has the power, in the face of determined lawlessness supported by an
acquiescent or conspiratorial community, to send federal marshals and agents
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for on-the-spot protection of the exercise
of federal rights. Such marshals and federal agents should be deployed in accordance with principles normally governing in law enforcement, in numbers
and with authority adequate to deal with all anticipated exigencies, including
authority and instructions to enforce compliance with federal law and to make
arrests for violations.
Moreover, the Attorney-General may seek through the courts appropriate orders to prevent any parties from interfering with the registration or voting process.* We are, therefore, glad to note that the Department of Justice in U. S. v.
Greenwood, now pending before the federal district court of northern Mississippi,
has taken the position that freedom of assembly in connection with voter registration is a right within the power of the Attorney-General to make secure.* '
CONCLUSION

There is an urgent need for bringing Congress into explicit support of
racial equality. Unless and until this is done, the national decision in favor of
equality is clouded and imperfect. The voting legislation of 1957 and 1960 has
not achieved this end. It reaches only the issues of discriminatory application of
state laws, or vicious interference with the exercise of the federal voting right.
The Acts of 1957 and 1960 fall short of a Congressional affirmation of equality
as an attribute of national and state citizenship.
* The argument made above in paragraph 6 was stated earlier by the Notre Dame
Law School Conference in a preliminary statement submitted to the President on February
12, 1963, and subsequently inserted by Senator Douglas in the Congressional Record for
February 19, at page 2388. The statement urged a more extensive use of executive powers
to cope with voting discrimination, and the employment of additional methods to expedite
cases and to bring them to satisfactory results. The statement was documented at the request of his conferees by G. W. Foster, Jr., Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin,
in a memorandum submitted to the Civil Rights Division on March 15, 1963.
**
Senator Javits introduced a bill (S. 1693) on June 11, 1963, which would give statutory
authorization for injunctions to prevent deprivation of rights by officials or private persons
in Albany or Birmingham-type situations that are not clearly related to voting rights. Comments by distinguished law professors regarding the Constitutionality and need of the bill
are printed in the Congressional Record for June 11 at pages 9970-9972.
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For reasons which are now a part of history, but also for reasons of intrinsic
value the first Congressional action should, above all, include a strong, welldesigned school desegregation law. We propose that this have the following
elements:
(a) "Desegregated schools" should be defined as those which accord
each child the right to attend a nonracial school system.
(b) The primary aim of legislation, at this time, should be to effect
starts in those biracial school districts of the South which have made no
beginning.
(c) To this end, each school board having jurisdiction over such
a district would be required to prepare and make public a desegregation
plan.
(d) Further, the Attorney-General must be authorized to bring
desegregation suits in the name of the United States, and to intervene in
cases brought by private plaintiffs.
(e) And further, technical assistance from the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare to facilitate desegregation should be available to
school districts, South and North, for projects specifically related to the
desegregation process.
(f) The right of private plaintiffs, through counsel of their choosing
to bring desegregation suits, should be carefully preserved.
The Notre Dame conference considered also the fields of employment and
voting.
Congress has waited long to act in enforcement of the 14th Amendment.
When it at last does so, it should direct its action toward fundamental causes

of racial inequity. The President's proposals for manpower training go to this
problem. But without effective legislation to ban job discrimination, they will
not be enough. A fair employment law is required.
The law should be administered by the Department of Labor (not by a
new commission), and should cover all phases of the employment process of
firms engaged in or affecting interstate and foreign commerce. The law should
reach also employment, of all descriptions, carried on by state or local governments and by private institutions for work financed in whole or in part by
federal funds.
We recommend further that, by several means, the law should rely on
administrative regulations rather than quasi-judicial methods for enforcement.
We think that this can be realized by incorporating the administration into the
Department of Labor, and bringing the whole structure of the Department into
responsibility for the work.
We propose that the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity be continued, and that it press strongly to bring governmental contractors into partnership with the national government through affirmative actions that specially contribute to the development of job skills among Negroes
and other minorities, and their full utilization.
In the third field - voting discrimination - the Notre Dame conference
strongly believes that additional legislation is not a sufficient remedy.
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The problem is neither nation-wide nor region-wide. The condition which
requires federal attention is the lawlessness that exists in a relatively small
number of outlaw communities of the Deep South.
This condition does not pose an issue of federalism. Federalism is a system
of divided power among governments, and governments are instruments whose
whole purpose is to establish an order of law. In these outlaw communities
where citizenship rights are flagrantly destroyed, there is no law to respect.
We have here, in short, a problem of enforcement, and the President's
power is adequate, strengthened by the Acts of 1957 and 1960, to create conditions which permit every citizen, freely and without fear, to register to vote,
to cast his vote, and to have it honestly counted.
This is the centennial year of Emancipation. It is also the year when Negro
patience with systematized social deprivation has finally broken. It is the year
for Congress to act.

